Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) was widely believed to be impossible for more than two decades. But recently, basing on an anomalous behavior found in quantum steering, we proposed a QBC protocol which can be unconditionally secure in principle. The protocol requires the use of infinite-dimensional systems, thus it may seem less feasible at first glance. Here we show that such infinite-dimensional systems can be implemented with quantum optical methods, and propose an experimental scheme using Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography had achieved great success in many fields such as key distribution [1] , but there are still other cryptographic problems remained unconquered. Bit commitment (BC) [2] is known to be an essential building block for coin tossing [1], oblivious transfer [3, 4] , and even more complicated multi-party secure computation protocols [5] . Unfortunately, since 1996 there were constantly proofs showing that unconditionally secure quantum BC (QBC) is impossible . This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem, was widely accepted despite of some attempts towards secure QBC (e.g., [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] and the references therein).
Nevertheless, the cheating strategy in all these no-go proofs are based on the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem [47] , a.k.a. the Uhlmann theorem [48, 49] . Recently, it was found that in infinite-dimensional systems, there exists a specific form of quantum states to which the HJW theorem cannot apply [50] . Basing on this finding, we proposed a QBC protocol and proved theoretically that it remains secure against the cheating strategy in the no-go proofs [51] . Therefore, implementing the protocol in practice will be of great significance because it can re-open the venue to many useful multi-party secure computation protocols that is once closed by the MLC no-go theorem.
As pointed out in [51] , since the protocol requires infinite-dimensional systems, the implementation may indeed be hard if we want to use physical systems with an infinite number of energy levels, because it may imply an infinitely high energy. To circumvent the problem, here we use the arrival time of photon as a trick, so that the infinite-dimensional systems can be realized using simple optical devices. Consequently, the QBC protocol in [51] can be implemented with Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer, which is within the capability of currently available technology. * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn
II. THE THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
Let us begin with a brief review on the definition of BC and the theoretical scheme in [51] . BC is a two-party cryptography between Alice and Bob, which includes the following phases. In the commit phase, Alice decides the value of the bit b that she wants to commit, and sends Bob a piece of evidence, e.g., some quantum states. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. The interval between the commit and unveil phases can be called the holding phase. An unconditionally secure BC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase).
In [51] we proposed the following protocol.
Our theoretical QBC protocol: The commit phase: (i) Alice decides on the value of b ( b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit. Then for j = 1 to s: She randomly picks an integer i j ∈ {1, 2, ..., ∞}, and sends Bob a quantum register Ψ j , which is an infinitedimensional system prepared in the state ψ b ij = (|0 + (−1) b |i j )/ √ 2. That is, if b = 0 she randomly picks a state from the set
or if b = 1 she randomly picks a state from the set
where |0 , |1 , |2 , ... , |i , ... are orthogonal to each other, and n → ∞.
Note that in each round, i j is independently chosen, while b remains the same for all j.
The holding phase: (ii) Bob stores these s quantum registers unmeasured. The unveil phase:
(iii) Alice announces the values of b and all i j ( j = 1, ..., s).
(iv) Bob tries to project each Ψ j into the state ψ b ij = (|0 + (−1) b |i j )/ √ 2. If the projections are successful for all registers, Bob accepts Alice's commitment. Else if any of the projections fails, Bob concludes that Alice cheated.
The key reason that this protocol can be unconditionally secure, is the specific forms of states in Eqs. (1) and (2). In general, the cheating strategy in the no-go proofs can be successful in most QBC protocols using other forms of states for the following reason. Suppose that honest Alice is supposed to send Bob the state ψ ′0 (ψ ′1 ) if she wants to commit b = 0 (b = 1), where ψ ′0 (ψ ′1 ) is picked from a set of states described by the density matrix ρ β 0 (ρ β 1 ). Since an unconditionally secure QBC protocol needs to be concealing against dishonest Bob, there should be
so that Bob cannot discriminate the state himself. Then the HJW theorem applies. That is, dishonest Alice can begin the QBC protocol by preparing system α ⊗ β in such a state that β alone has density matrix ρ β 0 . Then she skips the measurement in the commit phase so that α and β remain entangled. In the unveil phase, since Eq. (3) is satisfied, according to the HJW theorem there exist two measurements M 0 and M 1 on α, such that if Alice applies M 0 (M 1 ) on α, then β will collapse to a state belonging to the set described by ρ β 0 (ρ β 1 ). Therefore, Alice can unveil b as whatever value she likes in the unveil phase by choosing between the two measurements M 0 and M 1 .
However, in our protocol the two sets of states take the forms in Eqs. (1) and (2). Suppose that dishonest Alice prepares a bipartite system α ⊗ β in the state
so that she can cheat using the strategy in the no-go proofs. Here {|α i+ , i = 0, ..., n − 1} is an orthonormal basis of the n-dimensional system α. Let ρ β 0 and ρ β 1 be the density matrices corresponding to the sets ψ 0 i = |φ i+ and ψ 1 i = |φ i1 , respectively. As shown in [50] , when n → ∞ although Eq. (3) is satisfied, the measurements M 0 and M 1 on Alice's system α display an anomalous result. That is, if Alice wants to collapse β into a state in ψ 0 i , the corresponding measurement M 0 is to measure α in the basis {|α 1+ , |α 2+ , ..., α (n−1)+ }. Else if Alice wants to collapse β into a state in ψ 1 i , the corresponding measurement M 1 is to measure α in the basis {− |α 1+ , − |α 2+ , ..., − α (n−1)+ } (see Eq. (28) of [50] ). Since the global negative sign before the state vectors has no physical meaning, the "two" measurements M 0 and M 1 are actually the same. Consequently, Alice no longer has the freedom to choose between two different measurements to alter the value of her committed bit b. Thus the cheating strategy in the no-go proofs fails in our protocol. Please see [51] for the complete security proof.
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
To realize our protocol, the most important point is to find a feasible implementation of the infinite systems.
Here we propose a trick to implement the infinite system in each round of the protocol using a single photon only. The experimental apparatus is illustrated in Fig.  1 . In each of the s rounds of step (i) of the protocol, Alice sends a single photon either from the source S 0 (for sending ψ 0 i ) or S 1 (for sending ψ 1 i ). Then it is split into two wave packets |x and |y by the half-reflected and half-transmitted beam splitter BS A , which is made of a half-silvered mirror. |x is sent directly to Bob via path X while |y is delayed by the storage ring SR A (which introduces a delay time τ chosen by Alice) before sending via path Y . At Bob's site, |x is delayed by the storage rings SR x and SR B . |y is delayed by the storage ring SR y which is identical to SR x so that they introduce the same delay time, then meets |x at the beam splitter BS B and interferes. We can see that when the delay times caused by SR A and SR B are tuned equal, the complete apparatus forms a balanced MZ interferometer, so that ψ 0 i (ψ 1 i ) will make the detector D 0 (D 1 ) click with certainty in principle.
Before running the protocol, Bob should use a set of devices identical to that of Alice's, to test and determine the error rate ε of the whole system, i.e., the probability that the photon ψ 0 i (ψ 1 i ) sent from the source S 0 (S 1 ) will mistakenly make the detector D 1 (D 0 ) click or simply get lost. Then Alice and Bob run the following experimental protocol.
Our experimental QBC protocol: The commit phase: (i) Alice and Bob agree on a maximum delay time τ max and the sending times t j ( j = 1, ..., s) with t 1 < t 2 < ... < t s and τ max < t j − t j−1 ( j = 2, ..., s). Then Alice decides on the value of b ( b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and for j = 1 to s:
Alice randomly picks τ j ∈ [0, τ max ], and sets the delay time of her storing ring SR A to be τ j . Then she sends Bob a photon Ψ j from the source S b at time t j .
Note that in each round, τ j is independently chosen, while b remains the same for all j.
The holding phase: (ii) Bob stores each photon in SR x and SR y unmeasured.
The unveil phase: (iii) Alice announces the values of b and all τ j ( j = 1, ..., s).
(iv) For j = 1 to s: Bob sets the delay time of his storing ring SR B to be τ j . Then he releases photon Ψ j from SR x and SR y and directs it into his part of the MZ interferometer (as presented in the green dash-dot box at the right-hand side of Fig. 1 ).
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If there are totally about (1 − ε)s photons detected by D b instead of Db, then Bob accepts Alice's commitment. Otherwise Bob concludes that Alice cheated.
IV. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PROTOCOLS
Now we show that the above experimental protocol is a faithful implementation of the theoretical one. In the experimental protocol, following the occupation number representation widely used in quantum optics [52] , at time t if there is a photon on path X and no photon on path Y , we can denote the state as |1 X |0 Y . Or if there is a photon on path Y and no photon on path X, we can denote the state as |0 X |1 Y . To make the time t more explicit, let us write them as |t X |0 Y and |0 X |t Y , respectively. That is, we use the symbol t in |... to denote the time that a single photon presents in the path, instead of the number of photons; and |0 means that no photon is presented in the path at any time. Obviously, the state |t P is orthogonal to |t ′ P (P = X, Y ) for any t = t ′ and they are all orthogonal to |0 P . For simplicity, suppose that except for SR A , SR B , SR x , and SR y , the time for the photon to travel through all other devices in Fig. 1 is negligible. Under this formalism, when Alice sends the photon Ψ j (j = 1, ..., s) from the source S b at time t j , the initial state of Ψ j after passing BS A is
After passing SR A which introduces the delay time τ j to path Y , the state of Ψ j that leaves Alice's site is
In the unveil phase when Bob learns Alice's delay time τ j and sets SR B accordingly, the final state of the photon Ψ j arriving at BS B after passing SR x , SR y and SR B is
where τ hold is the length of the time that Ψ j was stored in SR x and SR y , and
Meanwhile, when combining with BS B , the detectors D 0 and D 1 serve as the projective operators P 0 ≡ |ψ 0 ψ| 0
and P 1 ≡ |ψ 1 ψ| 1 ,
respectively, where
and
with t B denoting the time that Bob applies the measurement. Therefore, if Bob takes t B = t ′ j , then the detector D b should click with certainty where b is Alice's committed bit. Otherwise he knows that Alice cheats.
To see that the above presentation of the states is equivalent to that in our theoretical QBC protocol, let us view the time range [0, τ max ] (within which Alice picks her delay time τ j ) as a series of time slot T 1 , T 2 , ..., T i , ..., T n−1 . Here 0 ≤ T i ≤ τ max (i = 1, ..., n − 1), and T i = T i ′ for any i = i ′ . When time can be treated as a continuous variable, there is infinite choices for T i , i.e., n → ∞. Now for each Ψ j (j = 1, ..., s), let us define
It is easy to verify that i ′ |i = δ i ′ i . That is, a single photon Ψ j can be treated as an n-dimensional system, with {|i , i = 0, ..., n − 1} being an orthonormal basis. With these newly defined |0 and |i , we can see that in the experimental protocol, when Alice chooses the delay time as τ j = T i (i = 1, ..., n− 1), Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
This is exactly the state that Alice sends in step (i) of the theoretical protocol for committing the bit b, as shown by Eqs.
(1) and (2). Thus, it is proven that our proposed experimental protocol is equivalent to the theoretical one, so that the security proof in [51] also applies. Consequently, the experimental protocol is secure as long as time can be treated as a continuous variable so that the condition n → ∞ can be reached.
V. FEASIBILITY AND COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENTAL RELATIVISTIC BC PROTOCOLS
The experiment apparatus shown in Fig. 1 is much the same as those of the quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum private query protocols in [52] [53] [54] . The only difference is that our protocol requires two more storage rings SR x and SR y . The QKD protocol in [52] was already realized experimentally in [55] . By comparing our apparatus with Fig. 1 of [55] , we can see that the technology in [55] is sufficient for implementing our protocol too. Detailed description of the actual experimental devices can be found in section III of [55] .
The most challenging part is to find storage rings SR x and SR y with a sufficiently long delay time, because they determine the holding time (the time interval between the commit phase and the unveil phase) of the protocol. Using 150km optical fiber (which was proven to be able to guarantee sufficiently high key rate for QKD in practice) to make the storage ring can generate about 500µs delay time. As far as we know, currently there are also commercial optical delay devices which can provide 1000µs delay time.
While such a holding time seems short, it is competitive with existing experimental schemes for relativistic BC [56, 57] . To this day, these two relativistic BC schemes are the only experimental implementations of BC which are known to be unconditionally secure (instead of computationally secure or conditionally secure, where the security has to rely on computational assumptions or imperfections of experimental devices instead of the validity of fundamental principles alone). In the experiment of [57] , the holding time is merely 30µs. The scheme in [56] managed to reach a holding time of 15.6ms, but Alice and Bob have to be separated from their agents by a straight-line distance d = 9354km. In general, the holding time in [56] is limited to d/2c, where d is the distance between Alice/Bob and their agents, and it has to be the straight-line distance otherwise the participants could cheat. Therefore, when the participants are close to each other in space, the holding time will be very short. For example, when d = 10km, the holding time will be 17µs only. On the contrary, in our protocol Alice and Bob are not required to be separated far from each other. The 500˜1000µs holding time can be achieved at any distance.
Moreover, in all relativistic BC (including [56, 57] ), Alice and Bob have to be associated by their "agents" so that the protocol is actually not a two-party protocol anymore. But our protocol does not require agents, thus it satisfies the definition of BC rigorously.
VI. SUMMARY
We showed that as long as time can be treated as a continuous variable, then each infinite-dimensional system in the unconditionally secure QBC protocol proposed in [51] can be realized using a single photon. Thus we obtained an experimental implementation of this QBC protocol which is feasible under currently available technology, with a holding time competitive with existing experimental relativistic BC schemes.
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